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G row th  or Development?:
A Review of The Prebisch Report 
on Latin America  1
by Dudley Seers 2
When i t  became known that Dr. Prenisc1 was w riting this report, 
expectations ran high. C learly i f  hi;, many talents were ever 
needed anywhere, the time is  now and the fla ce  Latin America, facing 
i ts  most profound crises. What would Prtbisch recommend, looking 
at the region with a fresh eye a fte r  s x 3 aar3 based in Geneva?
Reviewing his report is  not a task t( be undertaken l ig h t ly . 
This is , a fte r  a ll ,  the culminating stutecent o f the author’ s 
career, the la te s t o f a distinguished series which Raul Prebisch 
has produced fo r  Latin America and then fo r  the world, f i r s t  a3 
Executive Secretary o f ECLA and la te r  ils ‘ ecretary-General of 
UNCTAD -  combining almost uniquely the ro] as o f diplomat, admini­
strator, theoretician and researcher. He is  the greatest liv in g  
practitioner, a sort o f Beveridge on the international scene, and 
he has done more to educate us on development problems than any 
other living man, except perhaps (and in rather d iffe ren t ways) 
Gunnar Hyrdal.
For this very reason he has a number o f enemies, and I  -  who 
am especially indebted to him -  have m  w. sh to provide them with 
ammunition. In any case this, his la te s -: report, is  not just the 
mixture as before. He devotes much imre attention than before 
to unemployment and income in equ a lities . The same applies to 
p o licy  on population and technical tra is ftr s  (though with some 
ambivalence), and there is  a new empha3is  on the dangers of 
economic t a r i f fs .  In teresting, though b i e f ,  references are made 
to the Soviet model and to the economic d :mage that can be done by 
advertising and by m ilita ry  expenditure. The section on the 
p o lit ic a l requirements fo r  tackling socia. problems marks a
’ Change and Development: Latin America’ Great Task’ (in te r-  
American Development Bank, 1970). I  bane itted  from discussions in 
the Latin American group at IDS before w riting th is review, and 
from attending a seminar in Santiago on t ie report, organised by 
IDB, ILPES and SID, at which I  put forward the main points in this 
paper.
2 Dudley Seers is  the D irector o f The In stitu te  o f Development 
Studies.
particu larly  welcome step forward fo r  a report published by a 
m i lt i  national agency.
But s t i l l  i t  is time, perhaps past time, to raise certain 
(p ieslions about the basic model lie continues to use, onto which a ll  
these new themes are g ra fted . This model, w iich serves to 
c.*ys1allise his philosophy o f development, is  a fam ilia r one to 
students o f Dr. Prebiscli's work, even though a d iffe ren t main 
ob jective is  specified now -  to cure unemploynen;.
Tnis requires, the report says, a high grow:h rate, ft per
cent for Latin America as a whole by 1980. Phi:: in turn implies
r.ip icly growing import demands; the burden can he eased by
regional in tegration, but nevertheless the ex arr.e foreign  exchange 
'gap' would require  a r is in g  inflow o f financia l resources from 
abroeji. From another point o f view, these are reeded to supplement
domestic savings. The report concludes that fo r  this 'gap' to be ) 
f  illed , import substitution and expox-t promotion would need to be / 
accelerated, and the flow o f resources to a i l  Id a 's  would need to / 
react the ITNCTAL-Pearson target o f 1 per cent o f the developed 
countries' gross product by 1975, and Latin Anerica would have to 
retain  it3  (15 per cent) share of these flows, and_ the terns o f 
a d would need to become much easier.
The f i r s t  question is :  what is  the purpose o f refurbishing
guppery? Do regional projections ju s t ify  such a heavy emphasis?
The aessage to Latin Americans to accelerate jrovth (there is much 
ta lk  o f 'd is c ip l in e ')  hardly needs such s ta t is t ic a l support.
They must be addressed to the United States (and it s  a f f i l ia t e s ) .
But would any calculations on these assumptions provide useful 
anraur ition  fo r  even a .sympathetic Washington pol: tlo ian , granted 
the UcS. p o lit ic a l scene as i t  is  today?
Is this rea lly  the r igh t framework, anywxy? The crucial 
question is  whether the main emphasis should >e on speeding up 
the growth rate or on changing the growth vro :es£ . The lo g ic  o f 
the Prebisch doctrine (a lo g ic  I myself ore; lcceptod) is  that 
fa s t economic growth based on protected indue tr illb as tion  would 
induce the advance o f other sectors o f the economy and the r e l ie f  
o f socia l problems, fo llow ing the pattern o f development in /
Western Europe and North America.
Actually, the rate o f economic growth has ir i t s e l f  not been 
unsatisfactory, averaging 5.2 por cent fo r  Latin America as a 
wi.ole from 1950 to 1968. Import substitution hat made a b ig
41*
Actually someone who believes, as Dr. Prebisch toes, that the 
irooms distribution  is morally wrong, cannot expect rea l national 
it com ■ .comparisons, using the prices derived :'ror this d istribution  
a- Im plicit weights, uo have much welfare con ten 1. Rather oddly, 
t c i port's output aeries do riot show wi^cii y e a i's  prices are 
( ven in p rin cip le ) being used. This could make a great deal o f 
d f f e . •nee in a 1950 to 1968 comparison, because commodity prices 
i.r 1950 were severely a ffected  by the recovery from, the 1949 
r ces ion and the s ta rt o f tiie Korean War.
coutribution, especially in the larger economies -  partly due to 
the influence of the 'Prebisch doctrine'. Iuports have risen at 
a rate of only 3.2 per cent over the same period. In some countries, 
industrial complexes have been created which, with a ll their 
imperfections, do make further advances possible. Nevertheless, 
the chief social problems remain unsolved; Indeed they are in some 
ways worse. From the very incomplete inform ition available, 
income distribution seems at least as heavily concentrated in the 
hands of the rich as it  was 20 years ago, and unemployment is 
greater, especially in its 'disguised' forms. The gap between 
town and country appears to have actually widaied, whether we look 
at incomes, education and health services, or fa c ilit ie s  such as 
electricity and water supplies (though from tnis particular gener­
alisation we must exclude Argentina and Uruguay -  and perhaps 
Chile ).1
As the report itse lf  shows, the process j f  growth has been 
such that the benefits of industrialisation have not been spread 
at a ll  adequately. Modern sectors have becoae in many ways more 
closely linked with foreign countries thar with their rural 
hinterlands (something which could never have been said of the 
growth process of Britain or France); they have developed 
consumption patterns and production technique! which reflect 
» those in fa r richer economies. With the notable exception of 
Cuba,^ foreign companies have played a big part in the import 
substitution process, and much of the benefit of the increased 
sales of manufactures has flowed abroad, rot only in growing 
purchases of equipment and components, but aloo in rising profits 
and royalty payments.3 Import substitution programmes have in 
fact often been too unseiective to make much contribution to 
relieving the foreign exchange constraint, their primary objective. 
Production costs are too high for many of the new factories 
(strikingly in the automobile industry) tc be able to export -  
and indeed they can hardly have been estatlisied with this aim 
in view.4
This does raise the question whether an economist from Argentina 
or Uruguay may not be tempted -  like an Ar.glo-Saxon economist -  
to base his model on his own national experience, though possibly 
with less damaging results.
2
There is actually no reference to Cuba (except a demographic 
one). This is odd in 1970, in a report cn Latin America and of 
such generality; Cuba represents one of ihe two paradigms of 
'change and development1.
3
The paper by Mr. Vaitsos in Vol. 3, No. 1 of the Bulletin  is 
interesting in this connection.
4
Many of them would o f course disappear i f  t ie re  was genuine 
economic integration.
Jtelatiep frtfrttPfi erowth in Industrie:! Output 11 j 
and in Industrial Productivity. 1 c-yH 'K ff tlA  
CJQleoUQM f o r  1ST79-1960
-m  m-Hi It H 111 H 111 i'l 111 MW- -4 4 H-M tit
j (Average percentage rates per ann;un) f h  ; 1
B razil
Latin America 
(hyp .) 1979-60
i S S B S f i t
Colombia1
• ♦ > t r ,
• Latin America 
i [hyp . )  1979-80
r  T Ecuador
Chile . yf r
\ t t m h
• Argentina
Paraguay
] T1 H i T H  H~H T T I  t t T T T  f iH  I f t  t— [— |—j— [~~~ T T j  | *'
^GROIfTB IN INDOSTRIAL OUTPO*' {x] 4) 44  T  M ~T~ T T T T l
j f l  I t  n i l : : : ;  t t i  t ; f : i : ■ f m  t i  t t l M  H T f f l T f f l f
'- {} ftT T  * These are the t*o hrpothetical projections ~
14'  tt-j i t n  for 1979-1960 aid ( 969-1 990) shown in
1 | [ j i  j [ j } Table 16 corres iond ng to and &fl overall 1
■t| t {  M i 1 growth rates.
!U ;U .: ]  u i j i i n  , : r II i u  11 
Scurce: Probisoh Report, Table 12 -
;t hii lit.: lliliiti.ii il:L! ttiii:
The other side of the coin, these new industrial pleints have 
not done much to relieve unemployment e itlc r The diagram, 
derived from table 12 in the report,1 shows n relation between 
industrial growth (x) and rises in labour productivity (Y) over the 
13 years 1950 to 1968, which is astonishingly close i f  one allows 
for statistical weaknesses. The picture it  reveals should make 
any growthmonger (Span. desarollista) pause. A regression band 
(drawn by eye) has been inserted to b ring ou'; the relationship; 
it  seems that about three-quarters of any increase in the growth 
of industrial output is accounted for by productivity rises 
(verifying Verdoom*s Law). Thus in Brazil, a 79? average growth 
in industrial output over this period was accompanied by a 5$ rise  
in labour productivity and only 2$ growth in employment; in 
Venezuela the corresponding figures were 11, 6 and 4. (Only 
Mexico shows a gain in employment more than half the rise in 
industrial production).
At the heart of the deepening structnral. problems of Latin 
Anerica lies a process of industrialisation which seems to have 
bacome perverted, based as it  is on the production of goods which 
do not require''much labour. This points to income distribution 
and output techniques as places to look for l u e s . 2 These are 
cartainly not overlooked by Dr. Prebisch, bui. then the report 
covers a wide variety of subjects in one way or another. What 
gives away a writer's real concerns is what 3ne attempts to handle 
quantitatively (even i f  only by the use of hypotheses),3 and to 
integrate into his central model.
Questions are also raised about the educational systems of 
Latin America; these have apparently failed to induce more 
appropriate consumption patterns and attitudes to work or to 
provide the skilled manpower needed in various sectors. Bduoation 
has alwayB been neglected in Dr. Prebisch's r'rame of analysis; 
this seems especially conspicuous now, in view of the amount of 
research done in this fie ld  in the 1960's.
To question a diagnosis is naturally to question the pre­
scription -  broadly speaking, a bigger dose of Dr. Prebisch's 
remedy, growth. First there is a major question about the
Countries showing productivity declines ha e been excluded, 
and also Panama, for which the data in the table are internally 
inconsistent.
2 These issues are discussed in the report o an inter-agency 
mission to Colombia under ILO auspices -  "Towards Full Employment" 
(iLO 1970). See also Bulletin. Vol. 2 No. i.
3
Income distribution is only analysed quantitatively in so far 
as i t  affects savings capacity -  whereas a s cructural approach 
really requires quantification of the imp lie  itions for the pattern 
of consumption.
p lc u s io ility  o f the projections in view o f pas-1 experience,^ 
o s jec ia r iy  the realism o f expecting industrial, oation to make 
a nuch bigger impression on unemployment than : t did in the past. 
Central to Dr„ Prebisch's thesis i3 the assumption (tab le  16 of 
tnc Report) that by 1979-80 a growth o f industrial output o f 9*7$ 
woi Id oe accompanied by only a 4% rise in labour productivity, 
permitting a 5,3% increase in employment. This is  shown on the 
difigran as Point A (the a lternative projection B is based or. 
slower growth). I t  would involve not merely rn acceleration in 
iric iis tr ia l growth but also u big displacement (to the right o f 
the re gression band re la tin g  increases in indue t r ia l  output and 
in p ro iu c tiv ity . Without 3uch a s h ift ,  one wculd expect a growth 
o f industrial output at nearly 10$ to be associate! with increased 
production o f about 6%, and o f employment about What
Dr. Pribisch is  in fa c t assuming is  a sharp riee  in the degree 
o f lab )u r- in tensity o f output, throughout Latir. America.
Techniiues may indeed be sh ift in g  -  but in the opposite direction^
A sreat deal o f new industrial investment is  bringing with i t  
even mire cap ita l-in tensive , indeed foreign-exchange-intensive, 
techniques; in fa c t many of the luxury products now being 
produced can hardly be manufactured in ways that provide much 
employment, especia lly  fo r  unskilled labour. In addition, the 
concentration o f income may s t i l l  be r is in g  in many countries.
I t  is  odd that these key projections are ro t ierived from, 
indeed are quite inconsistent with, the h is to r ica l data assembled 
in the report. The implications o f the policy e f fo r t  required 
by Dr. Prebisch's projections may thus be greater .han he
reeogn._ses. The change he predicates in the development process
can ha 'd ly be achieved without, in ter a l ia , a nore active 
screen.ng o f imported technology and a bigger red istribu tion  o f 
income than the report proposes -  in fa c t without absolute declines
in the real incomes of the rich.
Y>»t even what is  proposed in the report la f a i r ly  drastic - 
a tigh ter control on foreign  investment and tax p o lic ies  that 
wo .fid only permit the top 5% o f the population to increase 
consumption gradually in the next decade. Is this p o lit ic a l ly  
r e a lis t ic ?  The new government in Chile appeals rsady fo r  such 
measures -  those o f B o liv ia  and Peru, even Colctnbii, may also be.
Is there, however, any prospect at a l l  o f other go/emments 
adopting them, especia lly  B razil (which carries a leavy weight 
in regional averages)? Many regimes are in o t f i c j  precisely to 
prevent socia l change.
Such governments can f a l l ,  but w ill  the pxoce3s of development 
be transformed and brought more under national control, even to 
the ex ent advocated in the report, without the co-operation of 
p o !it ic a l forces which would seem sc unpalatable t j  Washington 
and Wall S treet as to make s t i l l  more unlikely the increases of
Cue i ondera in passing how sensitive the regional import 
P jec ione are to d iffe ren t  growth rates in d i f f e  rent countries.
a: d and foreign investment which are assumed*} In fact an outflow
of capital seems a more probable consequence of an opening to the 
Left. One need look no further than the recent experience of 
Chile.
There are other apparent inconsistenciec. Would not the 
reforms proposed -  of land tenure, taxation, ta r iff  structure, 
etc. -  almost c e r t a i n l y  slow down growth, at least for a few years, 
while they were being digested, especially i l  carried out simul­
taneously? One set of such reforms has certainly had this effect 
in Cuba, but the same could well happen without a revolution, or 
even a change of government.
It  is understandable that such questLonn are not usually 
posed in the publications of banks.^ (inieei Dr. Herrera of IBD 
was rather courageous to publish a report wh: ch goe3 as far as this 
one does). But my query -  a sad one to nave to ask about a 
document to which Dr. Prebisch has put his name -  is whether the 
central analytical framework he employs, useful as it  was in its V
time, does not now, in the 1970's, steer attention away from the
real issues.
Surely growth rate targets are less important than social 
targets, whether for continents or countries , An 8$ rate with 
certain patterns of growth, indeed with the existing distributions 
by sector and by income bracket, may well me*n less development 
ia the sense I use the word than (say) a \%> growth rate combined 
with firm measures to redistribute in co m e .  ^ Indeed, from what
we know of countries in the region with even 6^ long-term growth 
rates in the 1950's and 1960's (such as Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Venezuela) i t  is questionable whether really fast growth can be 
achieved without such a heavy concentration >n modem parts of \ 
the economy as to induce s t i l l  greater dependence on foreign I 
countries, s t i l l  greater inequalities, and a continued, or even 
accelerated, increase in unemployment. (Thx rising wage rates 
in the leading sectors can, by emulation, in libit the growth of 
other sectors, or actually destroy them). Ihis in turn raises 
the question whether fast growth w ill not, e/en i f  i t  is feasible,
eventually produce po litical stresses so sev ire as to bring
itse lf  to an end.
One wonders whether it  w ill be very feesible henceforward, 
especially in Latin America, to continue to :ombine operational 
and professional careers as Dr. Prebisch has done so successfully 
and for so long.
2 It is time that in the case of Colombia, the combined implications 
of the targets we suggest for employment, an 1 the guesses made about 
productivity imply a gTowth rate of 8^. However this is not a 
target in its e lf  -  the emphasis is on tht employment targets and the 
policies they imply, especially for incomes and technology needed 
to reach i t .  We raise in the report the question whether Colombia 
can achieve Buch far-reaching changes without reduction (para 844), 
but fe lt  we should state the fu ll economic requirements of a fu ll  
employment policy.
There is a curious lack of consistency between Dr. Prebisch* 
approaches in the two main fie ld s  o f his l i f e * 3 work. In the 
f ie ld  o f international po licy , he has -  as shown by his reports 
as Secretary-General o f UNCTAD -  led the way by d recting a tten ti 
to the process o f growth o f the world economy, no'; its  overa ll 
average rate; his work focusses on changes in the world income 
d istribu tion , especia lly  on the weaknesses o f the mechanisms fo r  
spreacing the growth o f industrial areas to tha ' yeriphery'„
Yet fc r  Latin America his central framework is  aggregative, 
concentrating on national incomes, indeed to ta l supra-national 
incomes covering nineteen nations, and attention .s focussed 
primarily 011 the need f  cr fast overa ll growth, rubber than on the 
processes o f growth and problems o f urban-rural in tegration . I t  
is  this model that needs change and development.
47.
